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La inflación anual al consumidor disminuyó por segundo mes consecutivo desde el 8,97% alcanzado en julio, para situarse en 7,27% en septiembre de 2016. Esta desaceleración, mayor que la prevista, se explica principalmente por el menor aumento en los precios del grupo de alimentos y, en menor medida, por la moderación en los incrementos de los precios de bienes y servicios más impactados por la pasada depreciación nominal del peso. Lo anterior sugiere que los efectos de los fuertes choques transitorios de oferta que desviaron la inflación de la meta (El Niño y la depreciación nominal) se están empezando a diluir a una velocidad mayor que la esperada. El promedio de las medidas de inflación básica también decreció, pero a un ritmo más lento: de 6,61% en julio a 6,29% en septiembre. En el mismo período las expectativas de inflación han cedido, aunque las de 2017 aún superan la meta: la de los analistas a uno y dos años se sitúan en 4,23% y 3,65%, y las que se derivan de los papeles de deuda pública a dos, tres y cinco años se encuentran alrededor de 3,6%. ; Annual consumer price inflation dropped for the second consecutive month, from 8.97% in July to 7.27% in September 2016. The slowdown, which was greater than expected, is mostly due to a lower increase in food prices, and –to a lesser extent– to the moderation in price increases for the goods and services that were most affected by past nominal peso depreciation. This suggests that the effects of the strong temporary supply shocks that diverted inflation from its target (El Niño weather and nominal depreciation) are beginning to fade faster than anticipated (Graph A). The average of core inflation measures also declined, although not as much, moving from 6.61% in July to 6.29% in September. Inflation expectations subsided during the same period, although they still exceed the target for 2017. Analysts' inflation forecasts for one and two years are at 4.23% and 3.65%, respectively, while expectations derived from government debt bonds to two, three, and five years are around 3.6%.

Banco de la República (the Central Bank of Colombia) is required by the Constitution to maintain the purchasing power of Colombia's currency in coordination with general economic policy1. In order to fulfill this mandate, the Central Bank of Colombia's Board of Directors (hereafter BDBR) has adopted a flexible inflation targeting scheme, by which monetary policy actions (MP) seek to lead inflation to a specific target and achieve maximum levels of sustainable output and employment. The flexibility of this scheme allows the BDBR to maintain an adequate balance between reaching its inflation target and smoothing output and employment fluctuations around their sustainable growth paths. The BDBR has set a 3.0% inflation target based on annual change in the consumer price index (CPI). In the short term, inflation may be affected by factors outside of monetary policy control, such as changes in food prices due to climate-related phenomena. To factor in this reality, the BDBR has also set a ±1 percentage point range outside its inflation target (i.e., 3.0 ± 1 pp). This range does not represent a monetary policy target, but rather reflects the fact that inflation can fluctuate around the target and will not always be equal to 3.0%. The main instrument of the BDBR to control inflation is the policy interest rate (overnight repo rate, or benchmark interest rate). Given that monetary policy actions take time to have their full effect on the economy and inflation2, the BDBR assesses the inflation forecast and inflation expectations vis-à-vis the inflation target, as well as the current situation and outlook of the economy, in order to determine their value. The BDBR meets once a month, producing monetary policy decisions in eight of its meetings (January, March, April, June, July, September, October, and December). In principle, no such decisions are made in the BDBR's four remaining meetings (February, May, August, and November)3. At the end of the meetings in which monetary policy decisions are produced, a press release is published and a press conference held by the Governor of the Central Bank and the Minister of Finance. The minutes of the meeting describing the positions that led the BDBR to its decision are published on the following business day. Additionally, the Monetary Policy Report (MPR)4, produced by the Central Bank's technical staff, is published in January, April, July, and October, together with the minutes. On the Wednesday of the week following the Board meeting, the Governor clarifies concerns about the minutes, and the Bank's Deputy Technical Governor presents the MPR. This dissemination scheme5 seeks to deliver relevant and up-to-date information to contribute to better decision-making by the agents of the economy. 1 Political Constitution of Colombia (1991), Article 373 and Decision C-481/99 of the Constitutional Court. 2 For further details, see M. Jalil and L. Mahadeva (2010). "Transmission Mechanisms of Monetary Policy in Colombia", Universidad Externado de Colombia, Faculty of Finance, Government, and International Relations, ed. 1, vol. 1, no. 69, October. 3 A Board Member may request an extraordinary meeting at any time to make MP decisions. 4 Formerly known as the Inflation Report. 5 The current communication scheme was approved by the BDBR in its August 2019 meeting.

Banco de la República (the Central Bank of Colombia) is required by the Constitution to maintain the purchasing power of Colombia's currency in coordination with general economic policy1. In order to fulfill this mandate, the Central Bank of Colombia's Board of Directors (hereafter BDBR) has adopted a flexible inflation targeting scheme, by which monetary policy actions (MP) seek to lead inflation to a specific target and achieve maximum levels of sustainable output and employment. The flexibility of this scheme allows the BDBR to maintain an adequate balance between reaching its inflation target and smoothing output and employment fluctuations around their sustainable growth paths. The BDBR has set a 3.0% inflation target based on annual change in the consumer price index (CPI). In the short term, inflation may be affected by factors outside of monetary policy control, such as changes in food prices due to climate-related phenomena. To factor in this reality, the BDBR has also set a ±1 percentage point range outside its inflation target (i.e., 3.0 ± 1 pp). This range does not represent a monetary policy target, but rather reflects the fact that inflation can fluctuate around the target and will not always be equal to 3.0%. The main instrument of the BDBR to control inflation is the policy interest rate (overnight repo rate, or benchmark interest rate). Given that monetary policy actions take time to have their full effect on the economy and inflation2, the BDBR assesses the inflation forecast and inflation expectations vis-à-vis the inflation target, as well as the current situation and outlook of the economy, in order to determine their value. The BDBR meets once a month, producing monetary policy decisions in eight of its meetings (January, March, April, June, July, September, October, and December). In principle, no such decisions are made in the BDBR's four remaining meetings (February, May, August, and November)3. At the end of the meetings in which monetary policy decisions are produced, a press release is published and a press conference held by the Governor of the Central Bank and the Minister of Finance. The minutes of the meeting describing the positions that led the BDBR to its decision are published on the following business day. Additionally, the Monetary Policy Report (MPR)4, produced by the Central Bank's technical staff, is published in January, April, July, and October, together with the minutes. On the Wednesday of the week following the Board meeting, the Governor clarifies concerns about the minutes, and the Bank's Deputy Technical Governor presents the MPR. This dissemination scheme5 seeks to deliver relevant and up-to-date information to contribute to better decision-making by the agents of the economy. 1 Political Constitution of Colombia (1991), Article 373 and Decision C-481/99 of the Constitutional Court. 2 For further details, see M. Jalil and L. Mahadeva (2010). "Transmission Mechanisms of Monetary Policy in Colombia", Universidad Externado de Colombia, Faculty of Finance, Government, and International Relations, ed. 1, vol. 1, no. 69, October. 3 A Board Member may request an extraordinary meeting at any time to make MP decisions. 4 Formerly known as the Inflation Report. 5 The current communication scheme was approved by the BDBR in its August 2019 meeting.

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